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The discount window refers to lending by each of
the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks to deposi-
tory institutions. Discount window loans generally
fund only a small part of bank reserves: For ex-
ample, at the end of 1985 discount window loans
were less than three percent of total reserves. Never-
theless, the window is perceived as an important tool
both for reserve adjustment and as part of current
Federal Reserve monetary control procedures.
Mechanics of a Discount Window Transaction
Discount window lending takes place through the
reserve accounts depository institutions are required
to maintain at their Federal Reserve Banks. In other
words, banks borrow reserves at the discount win-
dow. This is illustrated in balance sheet form in
Figure 1. Suppose the funding officer at Ralph’s
Bank finds it has an unanticipated reserve deficiency
of $l,000,000 and decides to go to the discount
window for an overnight loan in order to cover it.
Once the loan is approved, the Ralph’s Bank reserve
account is credited with $l,000,000. This shows up
on the asset side of Ralph’s balance sheet as an in-
crease in “Reserves with Federal Reserve Bank,”
and on the liability side as an increase in “Borrow-
ings from Federal Reserve Bank.” The transaction
also shows up on the Federal Reserve Bank’s balance
sheet as an increase in “Discounts and Advances”
on the asset side and an increase in “Bank Reserve
* An abbreviated version of this article will appear as a
chapter in Instruments of the Money Market,  6th edition,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1986 (forthcom-
ing December 1986).
Accounts” on the liability side. This set of balance
sheet entries takes place in all the examples given in
the Box.
The next day, Ralph’s Bank could raise the funds
to repay the loan by, for example, increasing deposits
by $1,000,000 or by selling $l,000,000 of securities.
In either case, the proceeds initially increase reserves.
Actual repayment occurs when Ralph’s Bank’s re-
serve account is debited for $l,000,000, which erases
the corresponding entries on Ralph’s liability side and
on the Reserve Bank’s asset side.
Discount window loans, which are granted to insti-
tutions by their district Federal Reserve Banks, can
be either advances or discounts. Virtually all loans
today are advances, meaning they are simply loans
secured by approved collateral and paid back with
interest at maturity. When the Federal Reserve
System was established in 1914, however, the only
loans authorized at the window were discounts, also
known as rediscounts. Discounts involve a borrower
selling “eligible paper,” such as a commercial or
agricultural loan made by a bank to one of its cus-
tomers, to its Federal Reserve Bank. In return, the
borrower’s reserve account is credited for the dis-
counted value of the paper. Upon repayment, the
borrower gets the paper back, while its reserve ac-
count is debited for the value of the paper. In the
case of either advances or discounts, the price of
borrowing is determined by the level of the discount
rate prevailing at the time of the loan.
Although discount window borrowing was origi-
nally limited to Federal Reserve System member
banks, the Monetary Control Act of 1980 opened the
Figure 1
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Example  1 - It is Wednesday afternoon at a regional bank, and the bank is required to have
enough funds in its reserve account at its Federal Reserve Bank to meet its reserve require-
ment over the previous two weeks. The bank finds that it must borrow in order to make up its
reserve deficiency, but the money center (that is, the major New York, Chicago, and California)
banks have apparently been borrowing heavily in the federal funds market. As a result, the
rate on fed funds on this particular Wednesday afternoon has soared far above its level earlier
that day. As far as the funding officer of the regional bank is concerned, the market for funds
at a price she considers acceptable has “dried up.” She calls the Federal Reserve Bank for a
discount window loan.
Example  2 - A West Coast regional bank, which generally avoids borrowing at the discount win-
dow, expects to receive a wire transfer of $300 million from a New York bank, but by late
afternoon the money has not yet shown up. It turns out that the sending bank had due to an
error accidentally sent only $3,000 instead of the $300 million. Although the New York bank is
legally liable for the correct amount, it is closed by the time the error is discovered. In order
to make up the deficiency in its reserve position, the West Coast bank calls the discount window
for a loan.
Example 3 - It is Wednesday reserve account settlement at another bank, and the funding officer
notes that the spread between the discount rate and fed funds rate has widened slightly. Since
his bank is buying fed funds to make up a reserve deficiency, he decides to borrow part of the
reserve deficiency from the discount window in order to take advantage of the spread. Over the
next few months, this repeats itself until the bank receives an “informational” call from the dis-
count officer at the Federal Reserve Bank, inquiring as to the reason for the apparent pattern in
discount window borrowing. Taking the hint, the bank refrains from continuing the practice
on subsequent Wednesday settlements.
Example 4 - A money center bank acts as a clearing agent for the government securities market.
This means that the bank maintains book-entry securities accounts for market participants, and
that it also maintains a reserve account and a book-entry securities account at its Federal Re-
serve Bank, so that securities transactions can be cleared through this system. One day, an
internal computer problem arises that allows the bank to accept securities but not to process
them for delivery to dealers, brokers, and other market participants. The bank’s reserve ac-
count is debited for the amount of these securities, but it is unable to pass them on and collect
payment for them, resulting in a growing overdraft in the reserve account. As close of business
approaches, it becomes increasingly clear that the problem will not be fixed in time to collect
the required payments from the securities buyers. In order to avoid a negative reserve balance
at the end of the day, the bank estimates its anticipated reserve account deficiency and goes to
the Federal Reserve Bank discount window for a loan for that amount. The computer problem
is fixed and the loan is repaid the following day.
Example 5 - Due to mismanagement, a privately insured savings and loan association fails. Out
of concern about the condition of other privately insured thrift institutions in the state, deposi-
tors begin to withdraw their deposits, leading to a run. Because they are not federally insured,
some otherwise sound thrifts are not able to borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
in order to meet the demands of the depositors. As a result, the regional Federal Reserve Bank
is called upon to lend to these thrifts. After an extensive examination of the collateral the thrifts
could offer, the Reserve Bank makes loans to them until they are able to get federal insurance
and attract back enough deposits to pay back the discount window loans.
window to all depository institutions, except bankers’ Finally, subject to determination by the Board of
banks, that maintain transaction accounts (such as Governors of the Federal Reserve System that
checking and NOW accounts) or nonpersonal time “unusual and exigent circumstances” exist, discount
deposits. In addition, the Fed may lend to the United window loans may be made to individuals, partner-
States branches and agencies of foreign banks if they ships, and corporations that are not depository insti-
hold deposits against which reserves must be kept. tutions. Such lending would only take place if the
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from other sources is not available and that failure
to lend may have adverse effects on the economy.
This last authority has not been used since the 1930s.
Discount window lending takes place under two
main programs, adjustment credit and extended
credit.
l Under normal circumstances adjustment
credit, which consists of short-term loans extended
to cover temporary needs for funds, should account
for the larger part of discount window credit. Loans
to large banks under this program are generally
overnight loans, while small banks may take as long
as two weeks to repay. Extended credit provides
funds to meet longer term requirements in one of
three forms. First, seasonal credit can be extended to
small institutions that depend on seasonal activities
such as farming or tourism, and that also lack ready
access to national money markets. Second, extended
credit can be granted to an institution facing special
difficulties if it is believed that the circumstances
warrant such aid. Finally, extended credit can go to
groups of institutions facing deposit outflows due to
changes in the financial system, natural disasters, or
other problems common to the group (see Box, Ex-
ample 5). The second and third categories of ex-
tended credit may involve a higher rate than the
basic discount rate as the term of borrowing grows
longer.
In order to borrow from the discount window, the
directors of a depository institution first must pass a
borrowing resolution authorizing certain officers to
borrow from their Federal Reserve Bank. Next, a
lending agreement is drawn up between the institu-
tion and the Reserve Bank. These two preliminaries
out of the way, the bank requests a discount window
loan by calling the discount officer of the Reserve
Bank and telling the amount desired, the reason for
borrowing, and the collateral pledged against the
loan. It is then up to the discount officer whether
or not to approve it.
Collateral, which consists of securities which could
be sold by the Reserve Bank if the borrower fails to
pay back the loan, limits the Fed’s (and therefore
the taxpaying public’s) risk exposure. Acceptable
collateral includes, among other things, U. S. Trea-
sury securities and government agency securities,
municipal securities, mortgages on one-to-four family
1 For more detailed information on discount window
administration policies, see Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,  The Federal Reserve Discount
Window (Board of Governors, 1980). The federal regu-
lation governing the discount window is Regulation A,
12 C.F.R. 201.
dwellings, and short-term commercial notes. Usually,
collateral is kept at the Reserve Bank, although some
Reserve Banks allow institutions with adequate in-
ternal controls to retain custody.
The discount rate is established by the Boards of
Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks, subject to
review and final determination by the Board of Gov-
ernors. If the discount rate were always set well
above the prevailing fed funds rate, there would be
little incentive to borrow from the discount window
except in emergencies or if the funds rate for a par-
ticular institution were well above that for the rest of
the market. Since the 1960s, however, the discount
rate has more often than not been set below the funds
rate. Figure 2, which portrays both adjustment credit
borrowing levels and the spread between the two
rates from 1955 to 1985, shows how borrowing tends
to rise when the rate spread rises.
The major nonprice tool for rationing discount
window credit is the judgment of the Reserve Bank
discount officer, whose job is to verify that lending is
made only for “appropriate” reasons. Appropriate
uses of discount window credit include meeting de-
mands for funds due to unexpected withdrawals of
deposits, avoiding overdrafts in reserve accounts, and
providing liquidity in case of computer failures (see
Box, Example 4), natural disasters, and other forces
beyond an institution’s control.
2
An inappropriate use of the discount window
would be borrowing to take advantage of a favorable
spread between the fed funds rate and the discount
rate (Example 3). Borrowing to fund a sudden,
unexpected surge of demand for bank loans may be
considered appropriate, but borrowing to fund a
deliberate program of actively seeking to increase
loan volume would not. Continuous borrowing at
the window is inappropriate. Finally, an institution
that is a net seller (lender) of federal funds should
not at the same time borrow at the window, nor
should one that is conducting reverse repurchase
agreements (that is, buying securities) with the Fed
for its own account.
The discount officer’s judgment first comes into
play when a borrower calls for a loan and states the
reason. The monitoring does not end when (and if)
2 In order to encourage depository institutions to take
measures to reduce the probability of operating problems
causing  overdrafts, the Board of Governors announced in
May 1986 that a surcharge would be added to the dis-
count rate for large borrowings caused by operating
problems unless the problems are “clearly beyond the
reasonable control of the institution.” See “Fed to Assess
2-Point Penalty on Loans for Computer Snafus,”  Ameri-
can Banker, May 21, 1986.
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THE SPREAD BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
FUNDS RATE AND DISCOUNT RATE
COMPARED WITH DISCOUNT
WINDOW BORROWINGS
the loan is approved, however. The discount officer
watches for patterns in borrowing and may look at
such summary measures as discount window loans
as a percentage of deposits and of reserves, and
duration and frequency of past borrowing. In addi-
tion, special circumstances and efforts to obtain credit
elsewhere receive attention. Finally, discount win-
dow borrowings are compared with fed funds market
activity to make sure banks are not borrowing from
the Fed simply to lend at a higher rate in the fed
funds market.
If the discount officer suspects that borrowing by
an institution has possibly gone beyond what is appro-
priate, he or she makes an “informational” call in
order to find out the particular problems and circum-
stances of the case (Example 3), as well as how the
institution plans to reduce its reliance on the dis-
count window. If little or nothing changes, it may be
time for counseling as well as a more direct effort to
help the borrower find new sources of credit. It is
conceivable that an institution’s credit could be ter-
minated if counseling were to fail, but this is rarely
if ever necessary.
The Borrowing Decision
When deciding whether and how much to borrow
from the discount window, a bank’s funding officer
can be expected to compare the benefit of using the
discount window with the cost. The benefit of an
additional dollar of discount window credit is the
savings of the rate on federal funds, which is nor-
mally the next best alternative to the window. The
marginal cost contains two elements. The first is
the price of discount window credit, that is, the
discount rate. The second is the cost imposed by
nonprice measures used by the Fed to limit the
amount of borrowing. An equilibrium level of bor-
rowing would be reached when the marginal benefit
of savings of the fed funds rate is balanced by the
marginal cost including both the discount rate and
the cost imposed by nonprice measures.
3
Antecedents
In the United States in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, establishment of a central
bank was urged in order to provide an “elastic”
currency. The central bank’s task would be to expand
discount window loans as production (and demand
for money) expanded over the business cycle. The
loans would then be repaid as goods finally went to
market. Such a view of the central bank’s role was
based on the “real bills” or “commercial loan” school,
which asserted that expansion of the money supply
would not be inflationary so long as it was done to
meet the “needs of trade.” In other words, loans
made by rediscounting commercial loans (which were
considered to be made for “productive” purposes)
would be self-liquidating since they would be paid
back as the goods produced were sold on the market.
The money supply increase would consequently be
extinguished.
4 Reflecting the influence of the real
bills doctrine, the Preamble to the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 included as a stated purpose “to furnish
an elastic currency.” Accordingly, the Act contained
provisions for the rediscounting of bank loans
“arising out of actual commercial transactions” and
defining what paper was eligible for rediscount.
Although the real bills doctrine had the most
practical influence on the development of central
bank lending, some nineteenth century writers argued
that the most important function of a central bank
was to act as lender of last resort to the financial
system. The first major writer to detail the role of a
lender of last resort was Henry Thornton at the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
5 In today’s
terms, Thornton described a lender acting as a “cir-
3 See Marvin Goodfriend (1983).
4 For a demonstration of the fallaciousness of this doc-
trine, see Thomas M. Humphrey (1982).
5 For a more detailed treatment of the material in this
and the following paragraph, see Thomas M. Humphrey
and Robert E. Keleher (1984).
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order to prevent problems with particular institutions
from spreading to the banking system as a whole.
He emphasized that the lender of last resort’s role
in a panic is precisely opposite that of a private
banker in that the former should expand lending in a
panic while the latter contracts it. At the same time,
Thornton did not advocate lending in order to rescue
unsound banks, since that would send the wrong
message to bankers, namely, that imprudent manage-
ment would be rewarded with a bailout. Rather, he
urged that loans be made only to banks experiencing
liquidity problems due to the panic. In other words,
the central bank has a responsibility to protect the
banking system as a whole, but not to protect indi-
vidual banks from their own mistakes.
The other important architect of the lender of last
resort idea was Walter Bagehot, who detailed his
beliefs in  Lombard Street  in 1873. Generally, Bage-
hot agreed with Thornton, but developed the lender’s
role in far greater detail. His contribution is best
summed up in the venerable Bagehot Rule: Lend
freely at a high rate. This implies three points. First,
the public should be confident that lending will take
place in a panic, so that there is no question as to the
central bank’s commitment. Second, lending should
go to anyone, not just banks, who presents “good”
collateral. In addition, collateral should be judged
on what it would be worth in normal times, and not
on the basis of its temporarily reduced value due to a
panic. Finally, borrowers should be charged a rate
higher than prevailing market rates. The justifica-
tions for a high rate are several, namely, ensuring
that central bank credit goes to those who value it
highest, encouraging borrowers to look first to other
sources of credit, giving borrowers incentives to pay
back such credit as early as possible, and compen-
sating the lender for affording borrowers the insur-
ance provided by a lender of last resort.
The ideas set forth by both Thornton and Bagehot
emphasized emergency lending rather than adjust-
ment credit. In actual practice, the Bank of England
did act as lender of last resort several times during
the late nineteenth century, but such lending was
done in addition to its normal practice of providing
adjustment credit at the “bank rate.” In the United
States, the real bills doctrine was more influential
in shaping the central bank than were the ideas of
Thornton or Bagehot.
6
6 The lender of last resort idea did surface in the practice
of some American clearinghouses acting as emergency
lenders during panics. See Gary Gorton (1984).
Evolution of Discount Window Practices
The only type of lending allowed Federal Reserve
Banks by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was dis-
counting. In 1916 the Act was amended to add the
authority for Federal Reserve Banks to make ad-
vances, secured by eligible paper or by Treasury
securities, to member banks. Advances replaced
discounts in practice during 1932 and 1933, when
the volume of banks’ eligible paper fell precipitously
due to the general banking contraction taking place
at the time. Emphasis on lending on the basis of
“productive” loans gave way to concern with whether
or not collateral offered to secure an advance, be it
commercial or government securities, was sound
enough to minimize risk to the Fed. Since then,
advances have been the predominant form of discount
window lending.
Nonprice rationing of Federal Reserve credit
became firmly established as a matter of practice
during the late 1920s. Use of the discount window to
finance “speculative” investments was already dis-
couraged due to the real bills doctrine’s stress on
“productive” uses of credit, but other reasons for
lending also received the Board’s disapproval. For
example, in 1926 the Board adopted a policy of dis-
couraging continuous borrowing from the discount
window. In 1928, it specifically stated that banks
should not borrow from the window for profit. Since
then, the Federal Reserve has emphasized nonprice
measures along with the discount rate to control
borrowing.
Because market rates were well below the discount
rate, banks used the discount window sparingly be-
tween 1933 and 1951. From 1934 to 1943, daily
borrowings averaged $11.8 million, and only $253
million from 1944 to 1951. For the most part, banks
held large amounts of excess reserves and were under
little pressure to borrow. Even after the business
recovery of the early 1940s, borrowing remained at
low levels. Banks held large quantities of govern-
ment securities, and the Federal Reserve’s practice of
pegging the prices of these securities, instituted in
1942, eliminated the market risk of adjusting reserve
positions through sales of governments.
The pegged market for government securities
ended in 1947, and the subsequent increased fluctu-
ations of these securities’ prices made buying and
selling them a riskier way for banks to change re-
serves. As a result, the discount window began to
look more attractive as a source of funds. By mid-
1952, borrowings exceeded $1.5 billion, a level not
seen since the early 1930s. Given the new importance
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1986of the window, Regulation A, the Federal Reserve
regulation governing discount window credit, was
revised in 1955 to incorporate principles that had
developed over the past thirty years. In particular,
the General Principles at the beginning of Regulation
A stated that borrowing at the discount window is a
privilege of member banks, and for all practical pur-
poses enshrined nonprice rationing and the discretion
of the discount officer regarding the appropriateness
of borrowing as primary elements of lending policy.
The new version of Regulation A notwithstanding,
the discount rate was for the most part equal to or
greater than the fed funds rate during the late 1950s
and early 1960s. As a result, there was not much
financial incentive to go to the window. By the mid-
1960s however, the difference between the fed funds
rate and the discount rate began to experience large
swings, and the resulting fluctuations in incentives
to borrow were reflected in discount window credit
levels (see Figure 2).
In 1973, the range of permissible discount window
lending was expanded by the creation of the seasonal
credit program. More significantly, in 1974 the
Fed advanced funds to Franklin National Bank,
which had been experiencing deteriorating earnings
and massive withdrawals. Such an advance was made
to avoid potentially serious strains on the financial
system if the bank were allowed to fail and to buy
time to find a longer term solution. This particular
situation was resolved by takeover of the bulk of the
bank’s assets and deposits by European American
Bank, but the significant event here was the lending
to a large, failing bank in order to avert what were
perceived to be more serious consequences for the
banking system. The action set a precedent for lend-
ing a decade later to Continental Illinois until a
rescue package could be put together.
Reflecting a discount rate substantially below the
fed funds rate from 1972 through most of 1974,
discount window borrowings grew to levels that were
high by historical standards. A recession in late 1974
and early 1975 drove loan demand down, and market
rates tended to stay below the discount rate until
mid-1977. During the late 1970s, the spread was
positive again, and borrowing from the window in-
creased. Borrowing then jumped abruptly upon the
adoption of a new operating procedure for day-to-day
conduct of monetary policy (described in the follow-
ing section), which deemphasized direct fed funds
rate pegging in favor of targeting certain reserve
aggregates. Because this procedure generally re-
quires a positive level of borrowing, the gap between
the fed funds rate and the discount rate has frequently
remained relatively high during the first half of the
1980s.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 extended to all
banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks,
and credit unions holding transactions accounts and
nonpersonal time deposits the same borrowing privi-
leges as Federal Reserve member banks. Among
other things, the Act directed the Fed to take into
consideration “the special needs of savings and other
depository institutions for access to discount and
borrowing facilities consistent with their long-term
asset portfolios and the sensitivity of such institutions
to trends in the national money markets.” Although
the Fed normally expects thrift institutions to first
go to their own special industry lenders for help
before coming to the window, private savings and
loan insurance system failures in 1985 led to in-
creased use of extended credit.
The Role of the Discount Window in
Monetary Policy
As a tool of monetary policy, the discount window
today is part of a more complex process than one in
which discount rate changes automatically lead to
increases or decreases in the money supply. In
practice, the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures
for controlling the money supply involve the discount
window and open market operations working to-
gether. In the procedures, there is an important
distinction between borrowed reserves and nonbor-
rowed reserves. Borrowed reserves come from the
discount window, while nonborrowed reserves are
supplied by Fed open market operations. While
nonborrowed reserves can be directly controlled,
borrowed reserves are related to the spread between
the funds rate and the discount rate.
During the 1970s, the Fed followed a policy of
targeting the federal funds rate at a level believed
consistent with the level of money stock desired.
Open market operations were conducted in order to
keep the funds rate within a narrow range, which in
turn was selected to realize the money growth objec-
tive set by the Federal Open Market Committee.
Under this practice of in effect pegging the fed funds
rate in the short run, changes in the discount rate
only affected the spread between the two rates and
therefore the division of total reserves between bor-
rowed and nonborrowed reserves. In other words,
7 These are described in more detail by R. Alton Gilbert
(1985) and Alfred Broaddus and Timothy Cook (1983).
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fed funds rate remained above the discount rate,
borrowing reserves from the Fed would become rela-
tively less attractive than going into the fed funds
market.
8 This would decrease quantity demanded of
borrowed reserves, but would increase demand for
their substitute, nonborrowed reserves, thereby tend-
ing to put upward pressure on the funds rate. Given
the policy of pegging the funds rate, however, the
Fed would increase the supply of nonborrowed re-
serves by purchasing securities through open market
operations. The result would be the same fed funds
rate as before, but more nonborrowed relative to
borrowed reserves.
9
After October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve moved
from federal funds rate targeting to an operating
procedure that involved targeting nonborrowed re-
serves. Under this procedure, required reserves,
since they were at the time determined on the basis
of bank deposits held two weeks earlier, were taken
as given. The result was that, once the Fed decided
on a target for nonborrowed reserves, a level of
borrowed reserves was also implied. Again assuming
discount rates below the fed funds rate, raising the
discount rate would decrease the fed funds-discount
rate spread. Since this would decrease the incentive
to borrow, demand would increase for nonborrowed
reserves in the fed funds market. Under the new
procedure the target for nonborrowed reserves was
fixed, however, so the Fed would not inject new
reserves into the market. Consequently, the demand
shift would cause the funds rate to increase until the
original spread between it and the discount rate re-
turned. The upshot here is that, since discount rate
changes generally affected the fed funds rate, the
direct role of discount rate changes in the operating
procedures increased after October 1979.
In October 1982, the Federal Reserve moved to a
system of targeting borrowed reserves.
10 Under this
procedure, when the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee issues its directives at its periodic meetings, it
specifies a desired degree of “reserve restraint.”
More restraint generally means a higher level of
borrowing, and vice versa. Open market operations
8 Broaddus and Cook (1983) analyze the effect of dis-
count rate changes if the discount rate is kept above the
fed funds rate.
9 Although under this procedure discount rate changes
did not directly affect the funds rate, many discount rate
changes signaled subsequent funds rate changes.
10 See Henry C. Wallich (1984). In addition, since Feb-
ruary 1984 required reserves have been determined on an
essentially contemporaneous basis.
are then conducted over the following period to
provide the level of nonborrowed reserves consistent
with desired borrowed reserves and demand for total
reserves. A discount rate increase under this pro-
cedure would, as in nonborrowed reserves targeting,
shrink the spread between the fed funds and discount
rates, and shift demand toward nonborrowed re-
serves. In order to preserve the targeted borrowing
level, the fed funds rate should change by about the
same amount as the discount rate so that the original
spread is retained. As a result, discount rate changes
under borrowed reserves targeting affect the funds
rate the same as under nonborrowed reserves
targeting.
Discount Window Issues
As is the case with any instrument of public policy,
the discount window is the subject of discussions as to
its appropriate role. This section will briefly describe
three current controversies regarding the discount
window, namely, secured versus unsecured lending,
lending to institutions outside the banking and thrift
industries, and the appropriate relationship between
the discount rate and market rates.
The risk faced by the Federal Reserve System
when making discount window loans is reduced by
requiring that all such loans be secured by collateral.
William M. Isaac, who chaired the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation from 1981 to 1985, has sug-
gested that this aspect of discount window lending be
changed to allow unsecured lending to depository
institutions.
11 Mr. Isaac’s main objection to secured
lending is that, as uninsured depositors pull their
money out of a troubled bank, secured discount win-
dow loans replace deposits on the liability side of the
bank’s balance sheet. When and if the bank is
declared insolvent, the Fed will have a claim to col-
lateral that otherwise may have been liquidated by
the FDIC to reduce its losses on payouts to insured
depositors. Sensing this possibility, more uninsured
depositors have an incentive to leave before the bank
is closed.
Mr. Isaac’s proposed policy is best understood by
considering how risks would shift under alternative
policies. Under the current policy of secured lending
11 Deposit Insurance Reform and Related Supervisory
Issues,  Hearings before the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 1 Sess.
(Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 27-8, 40. As an
alternative, Mr. Isaac has suggested that if the policy of
making only secured loans at the window is continued,
only institutions that have been certified solvent by their
primary regulators should be eligible.
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that fails before the loan is paid back, the fact that the
loan is secured makes it unlikely that the Fed will
take a loss on the loan. Losses will be borne by the
FDIC fund, which is financed by premiums paid by
insured banks. Thus, risk in this case is assumed by
the stockholders of FDIC-insured banks.
12 Under
Mr. Isaac’s alternative, the Fed would become a
general rather than a fully secured creditor of the
failed bank. As a result, losses would be borne by
both the Fed and the FDIC fund, depending on the
priority given the Fed as a claimant on the failed
bank’s assets. Since losses borne by the Fed reduce
the net revenues available for transfer to the United
States Treasury, the taxpaying public would likely
end up bearing more of the risk than under current
policy. The attractiveness of moving to a policy of
unsecured discount window lending thus depends on
the degree to which one feels risks should be shifted
from bank stockholders to the general public.
13
A second discount window issue involves the exer-
cise of the Fed’s authority to lend to individuals,
partnerships, and corporations. Although such lend-
ing has not occurred for over half a century, major
events such as the failure of Penn Central in the
mid-1970s and the problems of farms and the manu-
facturing sector of the 1980s raise the question of
whether or not this authority should be exercised. On
the one hand, one might argue that banking is an in-
dustry like any other, and that lending to nonfinancial
firms threatened by international competition makes
just as much sense as lending to forestall or avoid a
bank failure. On the other hand, the Federal Re-
serve’s primary responsibility is to the financial
system, and decisions regarding lending to assist
troubled industries are better left to Congress than to
the Board of Governors.
14
A final issue regarding the discount window is
whether to set the discount rate above or below the
12 Since Congress has pledged the full faith and credit of
the United States government to the fund, it is also
possible that the public may bear some of the losses.
13 
Fed Chairman Paul Volcker has characterized the
proposal as changing the Fed from a provider of liquidity
to a provider of capital to depository institutions. Ibid.,
pp. 1287-8.
14 
Ibid., pp. 1315-6. For a discussion of the possibility of
discount window lending to the Farm Credit System, see
The Problems of Farm Credit, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Economic Stabilization of the House Com-
mittee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong. 1 Sess. (GPO, 1985), pp. 449-55, 501-4.
prevailing fed funds rate.
15 Figure 2 shows that both
policies have been followed at different times during
the last thirty years. One could make several argu-
ments in favor of a policy of setting the discount rate
above the funds rate. First, as mentioned earlier,
placing a higher price on discount window credit
would ensure that only those placing a high value
on a discount window loan would use the credit.
Since funds could normally be gotten more cheaply in
the fed funds market, institutions would only use the
window in emergencies. Second, it would remove the
incentive to profit from the spread between the dis-
count rate and the fed funds rate. As a result, the
process of allocating discount window credit would be
simplified and many of the rules regarding appropri-
ate uses of credit would be unnecessary. Finally, it
might simplify the mechanism for controlling the
money supply, since borrowed reserves would not
likely be a significant element of total reserves. In-
deed, setting targets for borrowed or nonborrowed
reserves would probably not be feasible under a
penalty rate. Targeting total reserves, however,
would be possible, and open market operations would
be sufficient to keep reserve growth at desired
levels.
16
Despite the possible advantages of keeping the
discount rate above the fed funds rate, it is not clear
what would be an effective mechanism for setting a
discount rate. Should the discount rate be set on the
basis of the previous day’s funds rate and remain
fixed all day or should it change with the funds rate?
Letting it stay the same all day would make it easier
for banks to keep track of, but incentives to profit
from borrowing could result if the funds rate sud-
denly rose above the discount rate. Further, what is
an appropriate markup above the fed funds rate?
Too high a markup over the funds rate might dis-
courage borrowing even in emergencies, thus de-
feating the purpose of a lender of last resort.‘?
Finally, some banks that are perceived as risky by
the markets can only borrow at a premium over
market rates. Even if the discount rate were marked
up to a penalty rate over prevailing market rates,
15 
For a more complete summary of arguments regarding
the appropriate use of the discount rate, see Board of
Governors (1971), vol. 2, pp. 25-76.
16 
For further arguments in favor of total reserves tar-
geting, see Goodfriend (1984). For arguments against,
see David E. Lindsey et al. (1984).
17 
Lloyd Mints (1945), p. 249, argues that a higher price
for discount window credit would discourage borrowing
precisely at the time when the central bank should be
generous in providing liquidity.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9such banks might attempt to borrow at the discount
window to finance more risky investments. In such a
case, certain administrative measures might be neces-
sary to ensure that, as under present policy, discount
window credit is not used to support loan or invest-
ment portfolio expansion.
Choosing between policies of keeping the discount
rate either consistently above or consistently below
the fed funds rate involves a decision not only on
how best to manage reserves but also on the relative
merits of using prices or administrative means to
allocate credit. Administrative limits on borrowing
may help to brake depository institutions’ incentives
to profit from rate differentials, but will not remove
them. Pricing would take away such incentives, but
there are difficulties with setting an optimal price.
As in most policy matters, the choice comes down to
two imperfect alternatives.
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